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COMMENTS
COMMENTAIRES
CIVIL LITIGATION-DISCOVERY-PUBLIC INTEREST IMMUNITY AND
STATE PAPERS .-It is hardly an exaggeration to describe as
revolutionary, the transformation in the attitude of the courts in
Commonwealth jurisdictions to claims by government that docu-
ments should not be subject to discovery because of the detrimental
effect that disclosure would have upon the ability of the public
service to discharge its responsibilities . As readers of this Review
will know, English courts for many years took the view that a
certificate submitted in proper form, normally by the responsible
Minister,' objecting to discovery or to the admission of oral evidence
was regarded as dispositive . In 1968, however, the House of Lords,
in the landmark case of Conway v. Rhnmer, 2 asserted that the
function of balancing the competing public interests in an effective
public service and in the administration ofjustice was ultimately one
for the courts . Set in its wider context, this decision was but an
illustration, albeit a particularly striking one, of a newly found (or
revived) judicial willingness to perceive in the conduct of the
business of government legal issues suitable for determination by the
courts . It narrowed the range of Executive discretion that was legally
unreviewable . Just as the general intellectual tide on which Conway
v . Rimmer was decided shows little signs of ebbing, so, in their most
recent pronouncements, the House of Lords and the High Court of
Australia have significantly weakened the barriers that had hitherto
appeared to provide sturdy protection to some highly sensitive areas
of governmental secrecy .
In both Burmah Oil Co. Ltd . v . Bank ofEngland 3 and Sankey v .
Whitlam,4 discovery was sought of documents that belonged to
1 Courts have accepted affidavits sworn by senior officials in the department
concerned to the effect that, having read the document, they consider that its
disclosure would be against public policy: Crompton (Alfred) Amusement Machines
Ltd. v. Commissioners ofCustoms andExcise (No. 2), [1974] A .C. 405; and seeD.
v . N.S.P.C.C ., [1978] A.C . 171, where a claim for immunity was made on behalf of
the Society, the party against which discovery was being sought .
2 [19681 A.C . 910.
3 [1979] 3 All E.R. 700.
4 (1978), 21 A.L.R . 505.
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classes of documents that Lord Reid in Conway v . Rimmer appeared
to regard as immune both from the exercise of the power of the courts
to inspect documents in respect of which "Crown privilege"' was
claimed, and from the balancing of interests . By the time that the
Burmah Oil case reached the House of Lords, the issues had been
narrowed to the disclosure of documents (or parts of documents) that
contained minutes of meetings attended by senior officials of the
Bank and of government departments, at some of which Ministers
were present .' In Sankey's case, a private prosecutor sought the
production of documents that included the minutes of Cabinet
mdetirigs . It was contended that,they might contain evidence that
would establish the guilt of the respondents, the former Prime
Minister and several - members of his Cabinet, of, inter alia,
conspiring to effect unlawful overseas, borrowings in an attempt to
avoid the Senate's refusal to approve the budget . In so far as the
judgments in - these cases mark important developments in the
common law they may well influence the way in which Canadian
courts balance the interests-of openness of government and due
process_ . of law against the need for complete secrecy about the
innetmost workings of government.'
s English judges now seem to have settled on "public interest immunity" as the
term that most accurately describes the legal rule under consideration. However, in
Science Research Council v .'Nass6, (1'0913 AllE.R . 673, Lord Scàrman made the
point that one advantage of the old terminology was'that it indicated that the scope of
the°doctrine was confined .to ."information the secrecy of which is essential to the
proper working,-of the government,of the state'.'_,(at-p . 697) ., Their Lordships'
opinions in Nassé make it--clear that their .decision in D . v. N.S .P.C.C ., supra,
footnote 1, is very unlikely to be used as a springboard for any dramatic extension of
the range of public interest considerations that will be found to justify immunity from
discovery. See British Steel Corporation v. Granada Television Ltd., The Times,
May-8th, 1980 (internal management.documents "leaked" by employee in breach of
confidence, discoverable, despite inhibiting effect upon investigative journalism) . .
This comment is confined to "class" claims for immunity, although the distinction
between "contents" .. and-"class", immunity may-,not be logically watertight .
s The plaintiff had at one time sought disclosure of, documents containing
financial and economic information supplied to the government by City institutions
and individual businessmen. Lord Salmon (at p. 7.13) thought that these documents
would be immune, whereas Lord Edmund-Davies (at p. 717) was "not satisfied"
that"a claim could bè made'oui . Both citedD. v.'N.S .P.C.C ., ibid ., to support these
contradictory conclusions. See,foomote 9, infra .
 7 The Federal Court Act, 1970, R.S .C ., 1970, 2nd supp ., c. 10, s. 41(2) would
appear to, make a Minister's certificate conclusive if it alleges, inter alia, that
discovery "would disclose à confidence, of the Queen's Privy Council,for Canada" .
It may be not totally without significance that in Attorney General ofQuebec v .
Attorney General of Canada (1979), .90 D.L.R . (3d) 161, at p. 185, Pigeon J.
expressly did not decide the question of whether a court of generaljurisdiction could
ever go behind a certificate covering documents falling within any of the categories
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Moreover, the cases have provided the first opportunities since
Conway v . Rimmer was decided for a careful consideration at the
highest judicial level of the scope of immunity from discovery to
which communications within the public service are entitled.$ In the
litigation of the last few years courts have been more concerned with
defining the circumstances in which public interest immunity may
arise in respect of information supplied in confidence, or under
statutory duty, to law enforcement agencies by persons outside the
agency . 9
This comment is limited to the way in which claims for the
disclosure of state papers are handled in civil litigation . Suffice it to
say that the primacy generally afforded the interest of an accused
person in defending himself from a criminal charge renders highly
dubious the application to criminal proceedings the principles
established in civil litigation . 10 It may also be that the public interest
specified in s . 41(2) . It should be noted that policy documents per se are not included
within s . 41(2) : quaere whether the existence of a statutory list of documents that are
specifically made immune from judicial inspection might induce a court to conclude
that in all other cases it is entitled to balance the competing interests . See further Re
Blais and Andras (1972), 30 D .L.R . (3d) 287 (discovery ordered of investigative
report that contained neither information given in confidence by informers nor matter
relating to general policy) .
s Cf., though, Attorney General v . Jonathan Cape Ltd ., [1976] Q .B . 752, where
Lord Widgery C.J . held that the publication by a Minister of details of Cabinet
discussions could be enjoined at the instance of the Attorney General as a breach of
confidence, although he held that on the facts of the instant case the public's "right
to know" how government worked outweighed any detrimental effect of disclosure .
See also Inuit Tapirisat of Canada v . Leger (1978), 95 D.L.R . (3d) 665, at pp .
675-676 (Fed . Ct, C.A .), where Le Dain J . held that the "duty to act fairly" did not
require departmental submissions to Cabinet to be disclosed to a person petitioning
for a review of a C.R.T.C . rate-setting decision . And see Gulf Oil Corporation v .
Gulf Canada Ltd . (March 18th, 1980, S .C . C ., as yet unreported), in which Burmah
Oil was discussed and held inapplicable to a Minister's objection, based on public
policy, to the disclosure of documents to be used at trial before a foreign court and
sought pursuant to letters rogatory .
I E.g . Rogers v . Secretary ofState for the Home Department, [1973] A.C . 388
(police informers) ; cf. the similar restriction imposed upon the duty of an
administrative tribunal to disclose the material in its possession : R . v . Gaming Board
ofGreat Britain, ex p . Benaim and Khaida, [197012 Q .B . 417; Lazarov v . Secretary
ofState of Canada, [ 1973] F.C . 927 . The decision in D . should be regarded as no
more than a relatively minor extension by analogy from Rogers : see footnote 1,
supra . See also Norwich Pharmacal Ltd . v . Commissioners of Customs and Excise,
[1974] A.C . 133 : Crompton (Alfred) Amusement Machines Ltd. v . Commissioners of
Customs and Excise, supra, footnote 1 . However, in Science Research Council v .
Nassi, supra, footnote 5, the House ofLords held that the possibly inhibiting effects
of court ordered disclosure of confidential reports kept by employers on their
employees' abilities and performance did not justify conferring an immunity from
production if they were necessary for the fair disposition of a case or for saving costs .
'° See, for example, Conway v . Rimmer, supra, footnote 2, at pp . 966-967, 987 ;
D . v . N.S.P.C.C ., supra, footnote 1, at pp . 218, 232-233 .
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in ensuring that those charged with criminal misconduct in public
office are seen to be subjected to a full trial, requires that claims by
the accused or the Attorney General to withhold from the prosecution
evidence of guilt should be examined with an even greater
circumspection than is called for in civil proceedings ."
The proceedings that reached the House of Lords in Burmah Oil
Co. Ltd . v . Bank ofEngland" arose on an interlocutory appeal out of
an action in which Burmah claimed rescission of a contract of sale of
its substantial holding in British . Petroleum Co. Ltd . (BP) and of its
interests in the North Sea oilfields . The Bank had paid a price - for the
shares that was somewhat below that being quoted on the stock
exchange at the time . The price subsequently rosé sharply . Burmah
shareholders received no benefit from this increase in the value of
the shares that the Bank had purchased . In addition to the price paid
for these assets, the Bank also provided guarantees for certain of
Burmah's debts on which the company was in danger of defaulting .
Burmah's case was that the Bank, at the instigation of the
government departments closely involved in the rescue operation
being mounted by the Bank in order to stave off a collapse of the
company and a request for foreign financial assistance, had unfairly
taken advantage of its superior,economic power, and that the terms
of the contract were unconscionable and unfair .
At an earlier stage of the negotiations the Bank had proposed
that Burmah and the Bank should share any profits arising from a
resale by the Bank of the shares should their value rise after the date
of the sale . Government Ministers later insisted that no such
profit-sharing concession should be made to the company . It was
plain from the documents disclosed by the Bank that Bank officials
had considered the original terms to be fair, and that this view had
been communicated to Burmàh and to the government . Burmah
sought discovery of the additional documents on the ground that they
might contain statements by officials of the Bank to the effect that
the terms upon which the government was insisting were unfair . To
establish that the Bank itself believed the final contract terms to be
unfair would, the company alleged, be valuable evidence in support
of its case .13
11 See Sankey v. Whitlam, supra, footnote 4, esp. at p. 504, per Stephen J. ; and
see Nixon v . U.S . (1974), 418 U.S . 683.
rs Supra, footnote 3 .
ra It is beyond the scope of this comment to consider the relevance of the
subjective belief of a party to the "objective" issue of whether the contract was
unconscionable . But it should be rioted that both the likelihood of finding relevant
evidence in the documents in question and the degree of relevance to issues in dispute
in the main action of anything that the documents might contain are germane to the
exercise by the court of its power to inspect and to order disclosure .
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The House of Lords unanimously declined to order the Bank to
disclose the documents that the Attorney General had, in the
proceedings below, intervened to protect." The significant, and
surprising point, however, is that by a majority their Lordships came
to this conclusion only after they had privately inspected the
documents and satisfied themselves that their disclosure was not
necessary for fairly disposing of the case or for saving costs . By
requiring a higher degree of relevance than normally must be shown
to obtain discovery, a limited effect was given to the government's
objections to producing the documents . 15 Lord Wilberforce, in
effect, dissenting, based his opinion on the ground that the
documents fell within a class that the courts will normally allow to be
withheld without inspection . He held that the plaintiff had not
established with that degree of certainty necessary to outweigh the
grounds for non-disclosure contained in the Minister's affidavit that
the documents were likely to contain material of clear probative
value to relevant issues in the main action . 16
An important question to which their Lordships directed their
attention was the authoritativeness of the assertion by Lord Reid in
Conway v. Rimrner" that certain classes of documents ought never to
be disclosed, whatever their contents . The classes relevant for
" Although the Attorney General was not a party to the main action, he was
joined as a respondent in the appeal to the House of Lords on the interlocutory
question . Lord Scarman (at p . 735) stated that a court should not order disclosure in
proceedings to which the Crown was not a party without first ensuring that the
Attorney General was afforded an opportunity to intervene . Nor should disclosure be
ordered before the Crown had exercised any right of appeal . The Bank, the defendant
in the action, had not objected to discovery .
Is Cf. Science Research Council v . Nassê, supra, footnote 5 .
is The standard of proof required to be satisfied by the party seeking disclosure
in order to persuade the court to cross the threshold and inspect the documents was
one of the issues upon which Lord Wilberforce departed from the majority . His
Lordship (at p . 710) found Burmah's assertion that the documents were "very
likely" to contain statements of the kind alleged, to be "the purest speculation" :
when immunity was claimed on the ground that the documents fell within one of the
classes specifically mentioned by Lord Reid in Conway v . Rimmer, the court should
only be prepared to exercise its power to inspect where the claimant had made out "a
strong positive case" . The majority, however, envisaged that the power to inspect
should be exercised much less sparingly, and that it was enough for the court to be
satisfied that it was "on the cards" (per Lord Edmund-Davies, at p . 719), or was
reasonably probable (per Lord Keith of Kinkel, at p . 726) or that there was a
"substantial case" (per Lord Scarman, at p . 734), that the documents would contain
relevant evidence .
It was conceded by the Attorney General that statements of the kind suspected of
being contained in the documents would be relevant to the issues involved in the main
action . It would seem, though, that Lord Wilberforce thought that they would be of
less probative value than did the majority .
11 Supra, footnote 2, at p . 952 .
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present purposes were "Cabinet minutes and the like", "all
documents concerned with policy making within departments", and,
possibly, "deliberations about a particular case" . The principal
rationale offered by his Lordship for excepting such classes of
documents from judicial inspection and the balancing by individual
judges of the competing heads of public interest was that :"'
. . . such disclosure would create or fan ill-informed or captious public or
political criticism . The business of government is difficult enough as it is, and
no government could contemplate with equanimity the inner-workings of the
government machine being exposed to the gaze of those ready to criticise
without adequate knowledge of the background and perhaps with some axe to
grind.
The breadth of this statement and the assumptions about the
relationship of government and governed upon which it appears to
rest might well qualify it for inclusion in departmental advice to new
recruits to the civil service. It certainly strikes a jarring note upon
ears accustomed to the clamour for increased openness in govern-
ment, and it has certainly seemed oddly out of place in ajudgment
that, in other respects, was highly sceptical of the Executive's claim
to be the final arbiter of the extent to which application of the normal
rules of discovery would prejudice the public interest . Lord Reid
gave little credence to the ground upon which immunity claims for
classes of documents was generally put by the government, namely,
the inhibiting effect that fear of possible disclosure in hypothetical
litigation would have on the frankness and candour of communica-
tion within the public service upon which its efficiency necessarily
depends .
How, then, did the House of Lords in Burmah Oil deal with this
apparent limitation upon a court's power to determine the propriety
of such claims? One argument advanced by the company was that the
documents in question did not fall within any of the categories
exempted from judicial scrutiny by Lord Reid . Thus, it was argued,
while the initial decision that the Bank should rescue Burmah was
concededly one of policy, subsequent deliberations about the terms
upon which the offer should be made did not justify this elevated
status : these amounted to no more than the mere commercial details
involved in implementing the policy decision to purchase . However,
given the inextricable links between the two questions, and the
political judgments permeating decisions over the disbursement of
considerable sums of money from the public treasury into private
hands, it is scarcely surprising that this attempt to skirt Lord Reid's
dicta received generally short shrift in the House of Lords." Only
'8 Ibid .
is In the Court of Appeal, Lord Denning M.R . evidently found the argument
attractive and could see no reason whythe handling of this publicly financed rescue
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Lord Salmon appears to have taken the issue at all seriously;" Lord
Wilberforce's attack upon this aspect of the company's case seems
totally apt in the circumstances, although the way in which this kind
of argument is handled in the future could depend upon the
formulation of the rationale for immunity that is adopted .
Apart from considerations of the need for candour, which are
considered below, is it possible to restate in more satisfying form
Lord Reid's concern for preserving governmental secrecy? One
possibility is that documents falling within these categories are
protected because premature disclosure might prejudice the govern-
ment's ability to bring to fruition the very policies to which the
documents relate or other policies that might be adversely affected
by disclosure of the documents in question." On the other hand, it is
perhaps less obvious that state necessity, rather than political or
administrative expediency, dictates that the government should be
able to withhold from discovery in civil litigation, arguments and
advice tendered in confidence to Ministers by their senior officials in
circumstances where prospective damage to government policy is
not apparent . 22 Nonetheless, Lord Reid's reference to the lifting of
privilege when documents within the classes that he had described
had become "only of historical interest" might suggest that he had
in mind the damage that premature revelation could inflict upon
policies that were ongoing .23 No doubt a court would be well advised
to give great weight to a Minister's explanation of possible adverse
effects of disclosure upon the success of aspects of government
policy that might not, at first sight, appear to be connected with the
subject-matter of the documents in question .24
operation should be afforded any more secrecy than it would have received had a
commercial, not a public institution, been involved : [1979] 2 All E.R . 461, at pp .
368-469 . Cf. Robinson v . State of South Australia (No . 2), [1931] A .C . 704, at p .
715 .
2° Supra, footnote 3, at p . 715 . Lord Keith of Kinkel (at p . 726) seemed also to
regard as not totally irrelevant the fact that the documents related in part to the
application of policy rather than to its formulation .
s' Cf. Freedom ofInformation Act, 5 U.S.C.S . §552(b)(5), which exempts from
required disclosure "inter-agency or intea-agency memorandums or letters which
would not be available by law to a private party in litigation with the agency" . This
exemption is discussed in Davis, Administrative Law Treatise (2nd ed ., 1978), §§533
et seq . The author (p . 405) summarises the effect of this exemption thus : "The key to
all the cases is that the fifth exemption protects the deliberative materials produced in
the process of making agency decisions, but not factual materials, and not agency
law . '
" Judges have regularly denied that political embarrassment is a relevant
consideration to be weighed : see e .g . Burinah Oil supra, footnote 3, at p . 720, per
Edmund-Davies .
23 Cf. Attorney General v . Jonathan Cape Ltd ., supra, footnote 8, at p . 771 .
2e Thus Lord Wilberforce concluded (at p . 707) that the fact that the documents
in question concerned events that had taken place four years before discovery was
1980]
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Another justification for withholding documents that relate to
Cabinet deliberations is that their disclosure might reveal that
conflicting views were aired by Ministers, and that this would
prejudice the collective responsibility of the Cabinet, a doctrine still
commonly stated to be of fundamental constitutional importance in
our system of government .25 On the other hand, recent British
political history is replete with instances of "selective leaking" on
an extensive and most enlightening scale, and one would be entitled
to regard somewhat sceptically any suggestion that the difficulties
that have beset British governments over this period have been to any
significant extent attributable to breaches of a constitutional
convention that seems nowadays to, be inspired as much by the
understandable desire of the government of the day for some shelter
from the rigours of the party political battle, . as by any more profound
reason of state.
One last possibility may also be considered, although it has
received no express judicial approval . This is that there are classes of
documents the disclosure of which courts, as a measure of
self-protective restraint, should normally not consider on a case-by-
case basis . The danger is that courts may imperil their status by
making decisions on matters that are likely to provoke allegations-
especially, in Lord Reid's words, from those "with an axe to
grind"-of party political favouritism. The legitimacy of the courts'
intervention in disputes, particularly when an agency of the State is a
party, depends in large part on the maintenance of a clear distance
between the courts and the party political arena." It is surely not
totally implausible to suggest that an awareness of the delicacy of the
judicial role in matters of public law may explain why courts have in
sought did not destroy the Crown's claim, because "all is not pasthistory, atleast we
do not know that it is" (emphasis added) . The effect to be given in any given case to
the lapse of time maywell depend on how the public interest to be balanced against
the administration ofjustice is defined. Presumably, an appellate court should decide
the claim for immunity in the light of facts existing at the time when the appeal is
heard, and not when the original order granting or refusing discovery was made .
25 This was the principal contention in the Crossman Diaries case, supra,
footnote 23, although Lord Widgery C.J . (at p. 771) also said that publication at that
time would not "inhibit free discussion in the Cabinet of today" . Statutory
protection is afforded to Cabinet papers in England by the Official Secrets Act, 1911,
1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 28 and the Public Records Act 1958, 6 & 7 Eliz . 11, c. 51 . On the
other hand, the disclosure of Cabinet papers that do not contain evidence of differing
ministerial views should be determined by considerations applicable to other
documents embodying policy proposals. The need to inquire about the content ofthe
particular Cabinet papers in question was emphasised in Sankey v . Whitlam, supra,
footnote 4, at p . 528, by Gibbs A.C'J .
Zs This is not, ofcourse, to deny that judges inevitably bring political values and
assumptions to bear upon decisions that raise in legal form questions about the proper
relationship between different branches of government and between the individual
and the state.
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the past been very reluctant to put themselves in the position of
deciding on a case-by-case basis whether the public interest requires
the disclosure of Cabinet or policy documents . As it is, the power
that the courts have assumed since 1968, to inspect documents for
which privilege is claimed and to strike a balance between competing
heads of public policy, already involves the courts in a more overtly
political function than they normally concede that they exercise . For
the courts to draw an admittedly rather rough and ready line at those
documents likely to contain explosive ammunition for the partisan
political debate may display a healthy instinct for institutional
self-preservation .
What, then, of the "candour argument" in the sensitive area of
high-level government decision-making? In Conway v. Rimmer,
Lord Reid evidently regarded it as being of secondary importance .27
However, it may well be that as a result of the difficulties in
formulating in a satisfying manner Lord Reid's principal rationale,
and of the opinions given in Burmah Oil, the time may be ripe for a
revival of "candour" in this area from, if not exactly the dead, at
least the moribund . Thus both Lords Wilberforce" and Scarman29
were prepared to give credence to the Attorney General's contention
that the inhibiting effect that an order for discovery would have upon
the candour with which senior officials tendered advice to Ministers
and communicated with other officials, could seriously prejudice the
efficacy of the decision-making process, especially in controversial
and sensitive areas of government policy . On the other hand, Lord
Keith of Kinkel" was even more dismissive of this argument than
Lord Reid had been in Conway v. Rimmer : and considerations of
candour have recently been given no more than a mixed reception by
the High Court of Australia .31 Because of the judicial ambivalence
27 Supra, footnote 2, at p. 952 .
22 Supra, footnote 3, at p. 707 .
29 Ibid., at pp . 733-734.
3° "The notion that any competent and conscientious public servant would be
inhibited at all in the candour of his writings by consideration of the off-chance that
they might have to be produced in a litigation is in my opinion grotesque . To
represent that the possibility of it might significantly impair the public service is even
more so" (ibid ., at p . 724) .
31 See Sankey v. Whitlatn, supra, footnote 4, at p. 527, where Gibbs A.C .J .
stated: "Some judges now regard this reason as unconvincing, but I do not think it
altogether unreal to suppose that in some matters at least communications between
ministers and servants ofthe Crown may be more frank and candid if those concerned
believed that they are protected from disclosure" (emphasis added) . Stephen J.,
however, said (at p. 545) of the candour argument that : "Recent authorities have
disposed of this ground as a tenable basis for privilege." Mason J. (at p. 572)
concurred in this conclusion . Contrast . however,Attorney General v. Jonathan Cape
Ltd., supra, footnote 8, at p. 771, where Lord Widgery C.J . evidently thought that
Cabinet discussions might be inhibited by the existence of the possibility of
disclosure .
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about this justification for granting immunity from disclosure for
state papers, and the effect that it might have upon the way in which
a claim for immunity is dealt with in a particular case, it is
worthwhile examining the argument a little more closely.
It would seem quite clear that the most important reason for
withholding the information given in confidence to law enforcement
agencies by informers has been the judges' prediction that the
possibility, albeit remote, of a court-ordered disclosure would cause
the flow of information upon which such agencies rely to diminish or
do cease. It is assumed that informers perform a function without
which the enforcement of the law would necessarily be much more
difficult . The reasons whypotential informers may be inhibited from
supplying information in the future may depend upon the particular
context. Sometimes the courts have emphasised that disclosure may
endanger the informer's life and limb . Police informers are useful
precisely because they maintain close- associations with dangerous
people who live on the wrong side of the law. In other cases, the fear
has been that the means of criminal investigation and detection or of
gathering intelligence information may be revealed if the communi-
cation is disclosed, and the future effectiveness of these activities
thereby prejudiced . Another, more contentious, proposition that has
recently received judicial support is that immunity from discovery is
necessary because the fear that civil proceedings may be brought
against the informant will discourage those with relevant information
from passing it to the relevant authorities .32 In yet other cases, the
inhibiting factor may be the fear of adverse effects upon the
informant's business and commercial reputation . 33
32 SeeD. v. N.S .P .C.C ., supra, footnote 1 (fear of libel action may discourage
from coming forward persons who suspect child abuse) .
33 Alfred Crompton (Amusement Machines) Ltd. v . Customs and Excise
Commissioners (No. 2), supra, footnote 1, is the leading illustration of a successful
claim for immunity on this ground . Although their Lordships' reasoning is not quite
as explicit as one might wish, the drift of the argument was clear enough . It was that
although traders were under a statutory obligation to supply information required by
the Commissioners-and the House of Lords in Norwich Pharmacal Co . v. Customs
and Excise Commissioners, supra, footnote 9, had refused to presume that the fear of
disclosure would dissuade individuals from complying with their legal obligations-
the possibility that it might be disclosed in tax assessment proceedings involving
other traders, would hamper that degree of co-operation between traders and the
authorities upon which the tax collection system heavily depends .
It may be noted that the House of Lords has recently held that the fact that
disclosure of the confidential reports made by employers upon their employees may
involve breaches of confidence and may interfere with the smooth operation of
promotion procedures does not justify extending "public interest immunity" to such
documents. Nonetheless, when an employer establishes an interest of this kind in
non-disclosure, discovery should not be ordered until the court has determined, by
inspecting thedocuments, that their disclosure is necessary for disposing fairly of the
case or for saving costs: Science Research Council v. Nassé, supra, footnote 1.
370
	
THE CANADIAN BAR REVIEW [VOL . LVIII
Many of these considerations would seem inappropriate to
communications within the public service, although in Conway v.
Rimmer itself little weight was given to the possibility that having to
defend a libel action might cause public officials to pull their
punches in personnel matters or other decisions calling for a frank
assessment of an individual's honesty or competence . 34 But what
about the situation in Burinah Oil where disclosure of the advice
might expose to liability the public authority for whom the official
works? Here, it might be suggested, the inhibiting factor upon
candour could be the possibility that disclosure of the advice would
attract public criticism to the agency or expose it to legal liability ;
this might jeopardise the officer's career or cause him to suffer the
embarrassment of personal publicity or adverse criticism in the press
or Parliament . The fact that similar concerns may as readily occur in
business or commercial enterprises, where confidential advice is
clearly not immune from discovery ,35 is not a conclusive argument
against treating public officials differently . For the reason for
granting immunity has nothing to do with any comparison of the
respective virtues and vices of public and private employees . Its
rationale is that there is a public interest in the proper functioning of
the public service at the highest levels that the courts have not
extended to the private sector . When applied to documents contain-
ing Cabinet discussion, the candour argument rests on the fear of the
damage that might be done to the political careers and reputations of
Ministers who were publicly revealed to have expressed certain
views in Cabinet or who were shown to be unable to win Cabinet
approval for departmental policies or interests . Such apprehensions,
it might be argued, would inhibit free and frank discussion of policy
in Cabinet .
In attempting to assess the weight to be given to any of the
claims outlined above, it is important to recognise the world for what
it is . It can be of little relevance that courts would prefer public
officials and Ministers to be made of "sterner stuff", and to be less
anxious than the government is apt in litigation to allege on their
behalf that they are, to ensure that their written thoughts are not
subject even to the remote possibility of disclosure in litigation . A
consideration that, on the other hand, may limit the scope of a
candour-based claim where the inhibiting factor is alleged to be the
fear of the official that his career may be prejudiced by the revelation
of the advice or information given by him to other officials or to
Ministers, is that there will be many instances where the conse-
quences of incompetence or lack of judgment will be felt whether or
as Cf. Sankey v . Whitlam, supra, footnote 4, at p . 527, per Gibbs A.C.J .
35 See supra, footnote 33 .
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not a court orders disclosure of the communication. For the content
of the çommunication will normally have come to the attention of the
official's superiors, and if it is seriously mistaken or ill-advised,
departmental sanctions will often be applied. Perhaps, though,
adverse consequences are more likely to be visited upon the hapless
official if his shortcomings become public knowledge.
'If the fear of threats to life and limb, or of hypothetical,
ill=foùndéd litigation justify drawing the veil of secrecy over
confidential communications between the citizen and public offi
cials, then it cannot be unreasonable to be prepared to confer
immunity from discovery 'upon communications between persons
within the public service in cases where similar fears may exist. But
when inhibitions upon candour are alleged to flow from the fear of
the personal or political embarrassment that would attend disclosure,
then the claims of candour would seem significantly less compelling .
Of course, one can do little more than guess at the probable effect
that disclosure rules will have upon behaviour, and how far the
' effectiveness of the public service will be impaired by officials'
unwillingness to, commit frank views to paper. As the case for
non-disclosure becomes less persuasive it is particularly appropriate
to bear in mind that the existence of the possibility of disclosure may
actually enhance the working of the'xnachinery of government by
increasing officials' sense of responsibility for what they, write, and
`thereby increase the accuracy and quality of their communications .
Openness of government both embodies , a democratic value and
serves as a practical tool .
. A consideration that may often be, of critical importance in
attempting to assess the weight to be given to a claim to exempt
documents from discovery is the relevance to the claim of the lapse
' of time between the events to which the documents relate and the
moment . when - their discovery is sought . It has already been
suggested that when immunity for state papers is put -on the basis of
the- damage that May be done to on-going government policies by
premature exposure, then considerations of timing may be critical .
However, the importance of the passage of time may be more
difficult to assess when the claim for secrecy is advanced in the
interest of encouraging candour of communication within the public
service. Presumably, this argument retains whatever vitality is
attributable to it for as long as the inhibiting fears may be fulfilled.
Perhaps the lapse of time will never remove from a public official the
fear of vexatious litigation as long as he, is alive. But- even before
death finally removes the threat of suits in temporal forums, the
further into the past that the applicable limitation period falls, the
more insubstantial the inhibiting effect of disclosure will become . To
attempt to suggest generally applicable standards for assessing the
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effect upon the lapse of time in other contexts would appear to be an
exercise in futility . It was, nonetheless, surprising that in Attorney
General v . Jonathan Cape Ltd . 36 it was held that the inhibiting effect
of possible disclosure upon the candour of Cabinet deliberations had
been exhausted in less than ten years, despite the fact that many of
the politicians and policies so vividly documented by the diarist were
still dominating British political life when the injunction to restrain
the publication was sought . In the Burmah Oil case, Lord Wilber-
force concluded that the strength of the "candour argument" was
"within limits, independent of time" .37 At the other extreme, Lord
Keith of Kinkel dismissed all of the bases upon which the claim for
immunity was put except the adverse effect of premature disclosure
upon on-going policy . On this view, the lapse of time is relevant in
so far as disclosure can no longer have this effect . The other opinions
delivered in Burinah Oil are curiously silent on this issue, doubtless
because their Lordships' inspection of the documents persuaded
them that it was unnecessary to conclude the balancing exercise .
One final aspect of the Burmah Oil case deserves mention,
although by the time that the case reached the House of Lords it had
ceased to be a live legal issue . In the Court of Appeal, 33 their
Lordships had been required to consider the effect upon a claim for
public interest immunity of an accidental disclosure of the docu-
ments in question . What had happened was that the documents
sought by the company had been sent to its legal advisers with the
parts that the government refused to disclose covered over .
However, this cover-up-like others of recent memory-was in-
competently executed ; it was possible to read the words that it had
been intended to obliterate . 39 The company's lawyers put the
documents in a sealed envelope and delivered them to the court ;
whether they had first passed on to their client the fruit of this
36 Supra, footnote 8 .
37 Supra, footnote 3, at p . 707 . He took the same view about the other basis of
the claim that he accepted, namely, that, "to reveal what advice was then sought and
given and the mechanism for seeking and considering such advice might well make
the process of government more difficult now" . Precisely what his Lordship had in
mind here is never made as explicit as one might have wished .
38 [197911 W.L.R . 473 .
39 Although the disclosure was probably attributable to bureaucratic bungling,
this incident will doubtless be savoured by the "conspiracy theorists" of British
politics as a telling example of the way in which the civil service establishment will
contrive to sabotage attempts by Labour Governments to exert pressure upon the
bastions of corporate power . Those inclined to such views will already have
concluded that it was no coincidence that the consequences of the courts' recent
willingness to expose state papers to the light of day in the Crossman Diaries case,
Sankey v . Whitlam and Burmah Oil were likely to be immediately damaging to the
Labour Parties in Australia and Britain .
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particular forbidden tree of knowledge is not made clear in the
report . The Court of Appeal permitted counsel forBurmah to use this
accidental disclosure to argue that the court should itself inspect the
documents because as a result of what he had seen he doubted
whether in fact they, fell within the description contained in the
Minister's certificate . The majority acceded to this request, and
concluded that the documents did indeed match the Minister's
description, and that they contained nothing of any significant
relevance to the company's claim.4o
Whether accidental disclosure of the documents would have
destroyed the Crown's claim that they should be immune from
discovery did nothave to be decided by the House of Lords. Lord
Scarman, however, intimated that it would not.41 The effect of prior
publication upon a claim for public interest immunity was subjected
to much closer examination in Sankey v. Whitlam'42 - where the claim
extended to state papers that . had been tabled in Parliament .
However, it should also be noted that in this case a claim for
immunity was deliberately not made for these documents on.-behalf
of the Commonwealth of Australia-a point to" which considerable
importance was attached in the High Court.43 The immunity issue
was raised by the respondent, who, by the time of the litigation, had
been succeeded in office by his political opponents . After making
short work of the contention that it would be a breach of
Parliamentary privilege for the court to attach legal consequences to
the publication of documents in Parliament;44 the High Court almost .
scornfully demolished the argument that it could be detrimental to
any public interest to require the disclosure in litigation of
documents that had already received wide publicity .' .
41 Lord Denning M.R ., dissenting, thought that the statements in the documents
were relevant, and, accordingly, ordered discovery.
41 Supra, footnote 3, at pp . 735-736; a similar view had been advanced by
Bridge L.J . in the Court of Appeal (supra, footnote 19, at p. 471) . Contrast,
however, Robinson v. State ofSouth Australia (No. 2), supra, footnote 19, at p. 718;
Whitehall v. Whitehall, 1957 S.C . 30, at p. 38 .
42 (1978), 21 A .L.R . 505 . Supra, footnote 4.
4s See ibid ., at pp . 530-531, per Gibbs, A.C :J ., pp . 549-550, per Stephen J.,
p.-575, per Mason J., where the view was expressed that a court should be prepared
to give at least as much weight to a Minister's decision not to claimimmunity on the
ground that disclosure would not prejudice the public interest, as is given to a
certificate submitted by a Minister to a court in support of the exclusion ofdocuments
on the ground of public interest .
"Ibid., at pp . 523-525, per Gibbs A.C.J ., .pp. 550-551, per Stephen J.
4s Ibid ., at p. 531, per GibbsA.C.J., pp . 546-548, per Stephen J., p. 575, pet
MasonJ. Cf. R. v. Toronto Sun Publishing Ltd (1979), 24 O.R . (2d) 621, where the
prior publication ofdocuments marked "secret" was held to be a defence to a charge
brought under the Official Secrets Act for publishing a "secret document".
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The circumstances in which the publication had occurred in
Burmah Oil were, of course, very different . For one thing, their
disclosure had been unintentional, and for another, they had been
revealed only to Burmah's legal advisers who realised that an error
had been made . Whether these differences should be regarded as
material, however, is not altogether clear . If the company could not
legally be restrained from copying and publishing the portions that
its officers were not supposed to have seen, it would seem somewhat
curious to continue to deny the company the use of the originals for
the purpose of supporting its cause of action . Evidence is not
normally rendered inadmissible because it was obtained in some
unethical fashion, 46 and it is difficult to see why documents should
not be discoverable when accidently disclosed-and the justification
for their being withheld thereby undermined-simply because the
disclosee knowingly took advantage of an adversary's slip .47 The
position might well be different if the Attorney General could enjoin
publication of the documents, on the ground of restraining a breach
either of the Official Secrets Act 4a or of an unauthorised disclosure
of a confidential communication . 41 For if widespread publication
could thus be prevented, the damage that would allegedly flow from
disclosure could still be avoided and the rationale for the public
interest immunity claim kept intact .
as For the most recent formulations of the principle, see R . v . Sang, [ 1979] 2 All
E.R . 1222 .
4 ' Compare the treatment by the courts of the question of whether public interest
immunity can be waived . It is clear that the Crown can always intervene in a suit to
which it is not a party and claim immunity for documents that the party in possession
is willing to disclose . This, of course, was the position in Burmah Oil . Moreover, the
court is obliged to raise the question itself if the parties do not, although it is difficult
to envisage circumstances in which documents would be held to be immune after a
Minister of the Crown had inspected them and, understanding the law, raised no
objection to their production on grounds of public policy .
But when immunity is claimed for a document solely because of its membership
of a class the revelation of which would inhibit candour in the public service, it is
difficult to understand why the claim should retain its vitality when the com
municator consents to its revelation . Nonetheless, in Science Research Council v .
Nassé, supra, footnote 5, at p . 693, Lord Fraser stated that were public interest
immunity to extend to confidential reports made about employees by their superiors,
"it could not be waived either by the employer alone, or by the employer both with
the consents of the individual who is the subject of a report and of the person who
made it" .
as R.S .C ., 1970, c . 0-3, as am . Although accidental or unauthorised disclosure
would not in itself impose a duty of confidentiality upon the disclosee, if it is
apparent to the disclosee that the information comprised the confidential communica
tion of one person to another, then he may well be under a duty not to disclose : Goff
and Jones, The Law of Restitution (2nd ed ., 1978), pp . 514-515 . Moreoever, it is
now clear that the doctrine of breach ofconfidence is applicable to both private and
public secrets : Attorney General v . Jonathan Cape Ltd ., supra, footnote 8 .
49 Cf. Rogers v . Secretary ofStatefor the Home Department, supra, footnote 9 .
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It might also be objected that to give this effect to prior
publication would enable a litigant to use his alleged possession of a
copy of the document being sought as a means of forcing
disclosure .-10 How would a court know whether he in fact had a true
copy? It could presumably inspect to see if this were so, and only
allow the claim for immunity, if otherwise sustainable, if inspection
revealed that one was indeed a copy of the other.s 1 Perhaps it still
might be argued that if the court found that the alleged "copy" did
not contain the same information as that in the document for which
immunity was being claimed, then the very possibility of acquiring
that knowledge might prompt speculative fishing expeditions . 'But in
the unlikely event that a court were to conclude that it would be
undesirable even to reveal that there were discrepancies between the
two documents tendered to it for inspection and comparison, it could
refuse discovery without reasons .
The importance of the two cases considered in this comment is
that they bring firmly within the ambit of judicial scrutiny an aspect
of Ministerial discretion that had formerly appeared to be unreview
able in the courts . It is not now of much importance whether Lord
Reid intended to establish legal rules or merely guidelines respecting
the court's power to inspect state papers of the kind under
discussion; in Burmah Oil even the Attorney General conceded that
the court had a residual power to inspect and to order their disclosure'
in highly exceptional circumstances. While there is an attractive
symmetry in extending judicial review irrespective of the particular
class of document at stake, the matter is not without its troubling
aspects .
For instance, an important criterion by which to test the
soundness of a legal proposition is the extent to which it is calculated
to facilitate the making of future decisions by judges . An open
invitation to judges, unencumbered by limiting and structuring
principles, to decide cases by reference to such large and open-
textured notions as "the proper functioning of the public service"
and "the administration of justice" is apt to prolong litigation,
create inconsistencies and encourage appeals . 51 Moreover, there are
inherent dangers, both immediate and long-term, in allowing judges
to wander at large over territory where they are likely to overestimate
the institutional competence of courts fully to appreciate the strength
of the Executive's claim. In particular, for the courts to assume such
a role in highly charged political contexts may cause doubt to be cast
so This was suggested as an appropriate solution in Sankey v. Whitlam; see
supra, footnote 46 .
si A large proportion of the cases involving a claim of "Crown privilege" have
been taken on to the House of Lords since Conway v. Rimmer was decided .
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upon the authoritativeness of judicial pronouncements in other areas
where the conduct of the Administration is called into question in the
courts, but wherejudgment is rendered by reference to better defined
and more and judicially manageable standards .
J . M . EVANS *
CRIMINAL LAW-EVIDENCE-DEFENCE OF ENTRAPMENT-DISCRE-
TION TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE.-The enforcement of the criminal law
is entrusted to the criminal courts and to the police . In seeking to
fulfill this undertaking both have distinct, yet complementary roles
to play . However, there are occasions when the courts are called
upon to investigate certain activities of the police which appear to
transgress the very laws that they are entrusted to enforce . In
resolving this dilemma, the courts have attempted to strike a delicate
balance between the right of society to be protected from criminal
activity and the right of the individual to be free from unwarranted
and intrusive police behaviour . In other words, while furthering the
ends of social justice by facilitating the truth-seeking process, the
courts must ensure that an individual accused receives a fair trial .
Canadian courts, like all other courts, have found such a task to be
extremely troublesome . In particular, the courts have wrestled with
the problems of a defence of entrapment, the doctrine of abuse of
process and the discretion to exclude illegally obtained evidence . In
the recent decision of Regina v . Sang, 1 the House of Lords and the
Court of Appeal addressed all of these problems and handed down
opinions which are of considerable interest to the Canadian lawyer .
Furthermore, the House offers some interesting insights into the
general philosophy underlying the Anglo-Canadian law of evidence .
The appellant, Sang, was indicted on two counts of conspiracy
with others to utter counterfeit United States banknotes, knowing
them to be forged and with intent to defraud, and of unlawful
possession of such forged banknotes . 2 After arraignment, but before
the Crown had opened its case, counsel for Sang requested that a voir
dire be held . He asserted that, if his claims were successful, the trial
judge would be obliged to rule that the Crown could adduce no
evidence against the accused and that the jury would have to be
directed to enter a verdict of not guilty . The court was told that,
* J . M . Evans, of Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto .
1 [197912 All E.R . 1222 (H.L .), [1979] 2 All E.R . 46 (C.A .) .
z The facts are taken substantially from the judgment of Lord Salmon, ibid ., at
p . 1235 .
